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Abstract. China is confronted with three intrinsic dilemmas related to farmland conversion: 
(1) conserving farmland for national food security versus converting farmland to boost 
local government income; (2) protecting farmland to ensure the basic living conditions of  
vulnerable farmers versus developing farmland to encourage farmers’ transition toward 
urban livelihoods; (3) preserving farmland by exercising national regulatory controls versus 
managing farmland through localised negotiations among the concerned stakeholders. 
This paper analyses three cases based on interview data collected from Shanghai, Guizhou, 
and Henan between 2009 and 2012. Each case consists of  an informal local resolution to 
one of  the three farmland dilemmas, and involves a variety of  actors—local entrepreneurs, 
ethnic minority farmers, and village committee members—who act as ‘barefoot planners’. 
On the basis of  these findings, this paper makes a series of  policy recommendations and 
calls for more flexible, spontaneous, and place-based farmland planning in China through 
social learning.
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1 Introduction
Farmland conversion is one of the most pressing planning issues in contemporary China. 
On one hand, rapid urbanisation and phenomenal economic growth in China have been 
very much supported by extensive farmland development in the urban periphery (Ho and 
Lin, 2004; Tang and Chung, 2002). Farmland, once converted to urban uses, proves to be 
important collateral that can attract external capital to promote the local economy and public 
finance (Zhu, 2004a, 2004b). Associated with this trend is the structural transition in the 
labour market, whereby the traditionally agrarian population in the urban periphery typically 
enters off-farm employments en masse (Selden, 1998).
On the other hand, China needs to feed its huge population with merely ~ 0.1 ha of arable 
land per capita (Lin and Ho, 2003). Serious concerns about food security have propelled 
the state to take a conservationist stance. Preserving farmland is clearly stated in Article 3 
of China’s Land Management Law as a long-term nationwide land-use policy (National 
People’s Congress, 1998). The latest national five-year plan (2011–15) further stipulates that 
China aims to maintain a minimum stock of 121 million ha of arable land resources and 
continue to protect farmland strictly (National People’s Congress, 2011).
Nevertheless, in practice, farmland conservation has never been implemented with full 
faith (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008). Enforcement has been difficult, especially in China’s 
urban periphery, where both the local authorities and farmers tend to prioritise economic 
development and off-farm livelihoods (Wang and Scott, 2008). The national farmland 
planning system seems to be challenged locally by the market economy’s ubiquitous presence, 
let alone the intellectual debates about whether farmland is worth conserving at all (Boland, 
2000).
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This paper addresses the issue of farmland conversion in China on the basis of three 
cases collected in the coastal municipality of Shanghai and the inland provinces of Guizhou 
and Henan, respectively. Each of the three cases illustrates a failure of the official state-
led farmland planning system. In the meantime, all of the cases also reflect the existence 
of highly localised negotiation-based informal planning mechanisms, led by actors such as 
local entrepreneurs, ethnic minority farmers, and village committee members, who manage 
to address the variegated practical tensions related to farmland conversion as ‘barefoot 
planners’ (Zinn et al, 1993).
This study has both substantive and intellectual implications. With regard to farmland use 
policy in China, this paper calls for more flexible, spontaneous, and place-based farmland 
planning to replace the one-size-for-all state regulations that prove to be ineffective as well as 
coercive in implementation. The theoretical aspect of this paper challenges the state-centric 
technorationalism underpinning the dominant planning discourse in contemporary China and 
accordingly advocates a social learning approach as demonstrated in this study.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 I reflect critically on the 
state-centric technorationalism permeating the dominant planning discourse in contemporary 
China, in light of which three fundamental dilemmas underlying the issue of farmland 
conversion are elaborated. Following that, in section 3 and 4 I give a brief presentation of 
the research methods employed in this study. Three cases from Shanghai, Guizhou, and 
Henan, respectively, are then reported in section 5, with findings summarised and discussed 
with reference to the construct of ‘barefoot planner’ in section 6. At the end of the paper, 
in section 7, a series of policy recommendations are suggested alongside the academic 
implications of this study for planning scholarship.
2 China planning, social learning, and barefoot planners
Planning discourse in contemporary China arguably features a state-centric technorationalism. 
As Zhang et al (2012) point out, urban planning is widely regarded in China as a professional, 
technical, and state-serving project. The literature on China planning, correspondingly, tends 
to focus on state-led megaprojects in major cities and regions (Duan, 2011; He and Zhang, 
2011; Wu, 2000), with much less attention paid to the everyday planning practice which, 
albeit often informal or even illegal, has been shaping the Chinese urban landscape from the 
bottom up (Leaf and Hou, 2006; Schubert and Ahlers, 2012; Tang and Chung, 2002; Wang 
and Scott, 2008).
The dominance of formalistic planning discourse in China has both institutional and 
ideological reasons. First and foremost, according to Zhang (2000), most urban planners 
in China tend to be public employers, who usually conduct either land-use management or 
physical spatial design, two essential functions reserved by the state to orchestrate and control 
urbanisation. Second, planning education in China is characterised with a much stronger 
emphasis on technical training, especially on design skills, than on the “social purpose in 
the underlying normative vision of urban planning” (Leaf and Hou, 2006, page 574). Third, 
researchers such as Tang (2000, page 355) also attribute the situation to the legacy of socialist 
planning ideology, mainly transplanted from the former Soviet Union in the 1950s, which, 
to a large extent, still influences the professional value regarding what urban planning is and 
whom urban planning serves in the postreform China.
From a more generic planning theory perspective, the aforementioned state-centric 
technorationalism underpinning planning discourse in China may also be considered a sign 
of high modernism as:
 “A strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific 
and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human 
needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and above all, the rational design 
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of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws” (Scott, 
1998, page 4).
Like Scott, Friedmann (1987) was wary of this kind of high modernism in his seminal 
review of four intellectual roots of Western planning theory—namely, policy analysis, social 
learning, social reform, and social mobilisation. He identified and analysed the four canons 
of planning theory quite purposely, in view of invoking a general intellectual transition from 
the more technical value-neutral realm of policy analysis to the more political value-laden 
aspect of urban planning in terms of catalysing progressive social reform and mobilisation 
(Hoch, 1990). Embracing a social learning approach to policy analysis is considered by 
Friedmann (1973) as a key step toward such transition and a core characteristic of what he 
called ‘transactive planning’:
 “This style of social practice has been called transactive planning, designating a process 
by which a scientifically schooled intelligence joins with the personal knowledge of the 
affected population in the process of social practice (Friedmann, 1973). It is through 
transactive planning that social practice discovers how to deal with a specific problem. 
Social practice may thus be understood as a process that generates not only a new and 
tangible reality but also the means of acquiring new knowledge about it. Social practice 
is a process of generating social learning (Wakely et al, 1976)” (Friedmann and Abonyi, 
1976, page 938, original emphasis).
A quite similar, albeit much less documented, theoretical proposition arose later from 
Zinn et al’s (1993) study of planning education in a globalisation context. Like Friedmann, 
they called for learning in situ from the often informal planning practice by local people 
rather than relying solely on expert planning knowledge:
 “ the barefoot planner approach … [is to train planners to have] a simple set of tools 
and selectively apply them to understand and develop locally appropriate solutions to 
problems. It also promotes the ‘practice of practice’, and reflection on the process, as a 
means to equip the practitioner to operate effectively in new or unique situations (Schon, 
1983” (Zinn et al, 1993, page 561).
One may argue that this kind of barefoot planner approach, as an example of social 
learning, is indeed much needed in China, especially given the dominance of state-centric 
technorationalist planning discourse vis-à-vis the pervasiveness of informal and sometimes 
even illegal local planning practice (Deng and Huang, 2004; He et al, 2009; Tang and Chung, 
2002; Wang and Scott, 2008; Wu, 2011; Wu et al, 2012). A shift of intellectual focus from 
the state-centred planning formalities to the grassroots-based planning informalities thus not 
only has important practical implications but also suggests a fundamental critical rethinking 
about the “epistemology of planning”, against a formalist planning ideology which presumes 
the unconditional superiority or legitimacy of certain “models and best practises” (Roy, 2005, 
pages 155–156).
To operationalise this kind of ideologiekritik (Guess, 1981), academic planning 
research needs to be reoriented toward such actors as local entrepreneurs, small planters, 
and community leaders, who, among others, often exercise informal ‘barefoot planning’ as 
“barefoot planners”, analogously to those unaccredited and the so-called ‘barefoot doctors’ who 
see patients in the Chinese countryside (see, eg, Sidel, 1972). In this spirit, in the rest of this 
paper I study the phenomenon of farmland conversion in China’s urban periphery, starting 
from three inherent dilemmas underlying the issue, in hopes of identifying solutions through 
social learning from informal local planning practice.
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3 Three farmland dilemmas
The past three decades in China have seen a considerable move away from central planning, 
with market-led development, deregulation, and retreat from socialist ideology (Yeh and 
Wu, 1999). Decision making on land use conversion, however, has remained relatively 
centralised. Preserving farmland is China’s long-term nationwide land-use policy, according 
to Article 3 of the Land Management Law (National People’s Congress, 1998). However, the 
implementation of this policy has been seriously impeded in practice (Lichtenberg and Ding, 
2008; Wang and Scott, 2008). Enforcement is difficult, especially in China’s urban periphery, 
where farmland use often involves conflicting interests, leading to a series of seemingly 
intractable dilemmas. Formal top-down interventions by professional planners, more than 
often, prove to be ineffective, given the fundamentality of these dilemmas.
3.1 Food security versus public finance
The most primary dilemma concerns the national preoccupation with food security versus 
the local reliance on farmland conversion as a major source of public finance. Historically 
speaking, farmland scarcity has been a long-standing issue in China, especially given the 
country’s huge and still growing population since 1949 (Yang and Li, 2000). China’s arable 
land per capita in 2007 was 0.105 ha only—equivalent to about half of the global average. 
This explains why the Chinese authorities have always considered food security a major 
challenge. Not only is farmland preservation clearly stated in Article 3 of China’s Land 
Management Law (National People’s Congress, 1998) as a long-term nationwide land-use 
policy, but the latest national five-year plan (2011–15) also declares an aim to maintain a 
minimum stock of 121 million ha of cultivatable land and continue to strictly protect farmland 
(National People’s Congress, 2011).
However, unlike the central government in Beijing, local authorities are usually reluctant 
to freeze farmland conversion, mainly for financial reasons. Farmland in the urban fringes 
are considered ‘gold mines’; for once developed for urban uses, it would yield huge revenues 
in the real estate market (Tang and Chung, 2002). Such land-based revenues have become an 
indispensable source of local public finance—as well as illegal private income (1)—through 
the state-led land expropriation procedure (Cartier, 2001; Li, 1999; Zhu, 1999).
An important way to understand the local authorities’ attachment to farmland conversion 
is to look at the current taxation system implemented in China since 1994 (Zhu, 1999; 
2004a). Before 1994, the old taxation regime in China was highly centralised, with almost 
all local taxation income submitted to and redistributed by Beijing. However, the 1994 
taxation reform, led by the then prime minister Zhu Rongji, devolved much more power 
to the local governments by setting up three categories of taxes: central, local, and shared 
taxes between the central and local authorities (Tsang and Cheng, 1994). The localities were 
henceforth allowed to tax capital-added values from land and property transactions as well 
as business and personal incomes (Tsang and Cheng, 1994, page 779). Converting farmland to 
business uses, in this sense, not only generates more local taxes from the property market, but 
also enlarges the local business and income tax base. In the meantime, a direct consequence 
of the 1994 taxation reform is that Beijing tends to intervene less in the local public finance; 
the localities are becoming more and more self-reliant. Within this background, almost all 
local bureaucracies choose to depend more on farmland conversion for government income. 
This is particularly the case for the poorer, less developed, and agriculture-intensive inland 
provinces, which used to enjoy substantial fiscal subsidies from Beijing but now have to start 
living on their own (Zhang, 2006).
The conflicts in farmland use strategies between the central and local government has 
led to a number of scandals. A very notorious case is about Tieben Iron Co Ltd, a steel 
(1) See, for example, Gong (2006) on land-related corruption in China.
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factory invested and owned by the government of Jiangsu Province (China Daily 2004). 
In order to build up Tieben, the provincial government expropriated a total of 436 ha of 
farmland in 2003 through multiple acquisitions, each involving a subdivision of less than 
35 ha. This was to circumvent Article 45 of the Land Use Management Law, which requires 
any local conversion of more than 35 ha of farmland to be approved in advance by the central 
government (National People’s Congress, 1998). Although this illegal conversion was later 
discovered and penalised, the case reflects a fundamental discrepancy between the central 
and local authorities in terms of how to deal with farmland.
3.2 Transition versus deprivation of livelihoods
The second dilemma concerns local farmers’ livelihood transition. While the most vulnerable 
farmers in China’s countryside still rely on farming for survival, many more have opted for 
off-farm livelihoods. Farmland conversion often brings industrial and commercial jobs to 
rural people and lets them earn much more income than farming (Wang and Scott, 2008). 
Farmland, in many cases, has also become the local people’s de facto collateral to attract 
and retain external capital. This trend has become even clearer since the 1990s, when many 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) went through their life cycles and transformed from 
labour-intensive businesses to ones anxious for capital. The comparative disadvantage of 
TVEs (ie, versus the state-owned and foreign enterprises) in borrowing formal bank loans 
has since then propelled many rural communities to put farmland at stake, in the hopes of 
attracting quick external investments (Perotti et al, 2010).
However, not everyone can easily adapt to off-farm livelihoods. Nor does everyone agree 
to give up farmland for the sake of economic development. The elderly, less educated, and 
ethnic minority farmers are often most susceptible to the various changes brought about 
by farmland conversion (Guo, 2001; He et al, 2009; Ho, 2003; Wang and Scott, 2008). 
Because of their hukou (registration status), farmers are generally excluded from the more 
favourable urban health care and pension schemes (Li, 2006; Shi, 1993; Zimmer and Kwong, 
2003). However, under the household responsibility system (HRS), the contracted farmlands 
(usually for fifteen to thirty years) can ensure many farmers’ basic subsistence, while the 
rural collective administration weaves a local social safety net for them (Krusekopf, 2002; 
Kung, 2002; Zweig, 1997). To the most vulnerable farmers, losing farmland often leads 
to a further demise of their customary social security system, hence a deprivation of their 
basic needs.
In this vein, it is not hard to understand the frequency and intensity of farmland-related 
disputes in China, especially those between the state and the rural grassroots (Cai, 2001). 
Contentions arise typically when the local authorities try to convert farmland through 
forced displacements of farmer households or compulsory land purchase (2) with insufficient 
compensations (Xinhua Net 2005a; 2005b; 2011). However, on quite a few occasions the 
local officials and farmers have also been found to collaborate closely in the course of 
farmland conversion, sometimes even collectively defying the formal national land-use laws 
(eg, Wang and Scott, 2008).
3.3 Regulated versus negotiated preservation
The third dilemma is more strategic, primarily focused on why and how farmland should 
be preserved in China. Boland (2000) documents the debates between those for and 
against China’s conservatism with regard to farmland use. While the supporters claim their 
(2) According to Article 43 of Land Management Law (National People’s Congress, 1998), almost 
all types of nonagricultural construction must be carried out upon state-owned land, which means 
farmland belonging to the rural collectives under HRS must be expropriated by the state before any 
land-use conversion. See, for example, Qu et al (1995) for more details about China’s land tenure 
system.
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endorsement more from the angle of national food security and sovereignty, the critics 
consider China’s policy economically inefficient. For example, Yushi Mao, a libertarian 
economist and policy commentator, alleges that there is no such food crisis in China as 
predicted by Brown (1995). According to Mao (2005), not only has China’s food stock 
been expanding, but the country can even afford food imports given its ample reserve of 
foreign currencies. He thus criticises China’s farmland preservation policy as being overly 
pessimistic and hindering urbanisation, which tends to cost even more than importing food.
While Mao (2005) represents a minority perspective in China, especially since 
the dramatic increase in global food prices in 2007–08, there are indeed more and more 
reflections regarding how farmland preservation should be implemented in China. For 
instance, Lichtenberg and Ding (2008) find that a substantial amount of farmland has been 
lost notwithstanding the stringent state regulations, because:
 “The fundamental problem with these policies is reliance on administrative measures that 
are simply unenforceable in practice in the face of existing incentive structure. The central 
government wants local governments to promote economic growth, provide infrastructure 
and services for a growing population, and exercise sound fiscal management. Under the 
existing system of land allocation, farmland conversion is the most attractive means of 
furthering all of these objectives” (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008, page 67).
They thus call for “aligning [the] incentives” (page 67) of the involved parties for a more 
effective implementation of the farmland protection policies. In a similar spirit, Wang and 
Scott (2008, page 327) also point out that, “whereas the state government still manages to 
intervene in the local conversion of farmland, such intervention is increasingly ineffective 
as economic liberalisation intensifies.” One important solution, according to them, is to 
negotiate and reconcile the interests between the government, business, and local farmers.
However, to enable such negotiation, the state needs, in the first place, to forego any rigid 
goal or ‘red line’ (Yang, 2012) in terms of maintaining a minimum stock of farmland. Many, 
however, fear that, without such strict command and control, the loss of farmland may be 
further exacerbated. In a broader context, negotiation between the state and the civil society 
also requires a relatively pluralist political environment, which is arguably emerging but is 
still nascent in present-day China (Wu, 2011). Plummer and Remenyi (2004), for example, 
identify numerous challenges for enhancing local government capacity for community 
participation.
4 Going into the field
4.1 Research question and methods
Is it possible to resolve in practice these seemingly intractable farmland dilemmas? This is 
the central research question for this study; and, to answer it, a social learning approach 
was adopted, and three fieldtrips were made in the summers of 2009 and 2012. The purpose 
of these fieldtrips was, (1) to identify cases involving some actual solutions to the three 
aforementioned farmland dilemmas in China; and, (2) to seek a detailed account of the 
motives, procedures, and outcomes of these events. A case-study method is best applied to find 
exceptions rather than to make generalisations (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Popper, 2002 [1959]) and 
seems to best fit the intention of this study, in that it seeks to target a limited number of cases 
rather than a sizable sample of observations. Moreover, gaining an in-depth understanding of 
the cases requires the researcher to interact closely and establish rapports with the local actors 
(Springwood and King, 2001; Wood, 2001). Because connections and trust take considerable 
time and resources to build up, only a small number of cases could be included.
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4.2 Site selection
Three sites were selected within mainland China for fieldwork (see figure 1). The first site is 
an agroindustrial park in the west periphery of Shanghai Municipality. Shanghai is located 
along the east coast of China and is one of the country’s largest cities. The second site includes 
two ethnic Miao communities in the periphery of Kaili, a small (albeit the capital) city of an 
Figure 1. Sites of study.
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ethnic autonomous prefecture in southwest China’s Guizhou province. The third site is an 
industrial development zone to the east of Xinxiang, a medium city within central China’s 
Henan province.
The three localities were chosen, mainly (3) because they represent different types of cities 
in China (see table 1). For example, Shanghai is a typical major city with its population and 
GDP many times higher than that of Kaili and Xinxiang. In contrast, Xinxiang has almost 
three times the cultivated land area than in Shanghai, exemplifying those inland medium 
cities which are often surrounded by a vast rural area. Kaili is the smallest city of the three, 
while its residents are primarily ethnic minority, with a very low level of GDP per capita.
4.3 Fieldwork
The fieldwork was mostly conducted in the summers of 2009 and 2012. More than thirty 
open-ended interviews and focus groups were conducted with more than sixty local officials, 
farmers, and business people across the three localities, both in formal and informal 
settings.(4) Several structured questionnaires had actually been prepared before the fieldtrips, 
but they were soon found out to be overly limiting and adapted later in order to give the 
respondents more freedom during the conversations. After doing so, the rigid ‘interviewer-
versus-interviewee’ positionality seemed to dissolve and more insightful information was 
collected in the end (Mullings, 1999; Stroh, 2000).
5 Negotiating the farmland dilemmas: three cases
5.1 The case of Wushe
Wushe agroindustrial park is located in the southwest periphery of Shanghai. The park was 
owned and managed by the local government. When Wushe was set up in 2001, the authority 
did not intend to run it as a business. Instead, the park was supposed to preserve 7.22 ha of 
arable farmland and to experiment with high-tech modern urban agricultural industry. Another 
implicit motivation, according to a park official, was to create jobs for farmers in the nearby 
villages, where the rapid expansion of Shanghai had encroached most of the local farmlands 
(Zhang, 2000). Though younger farmers in the localities had quickly moved to the secondary 
and tertiary sectors, most of their elderly counterparts knew how to live only by farming and 
thus constituted the majority of the employees in Wushe during the first few years after 2001.
At that time, as an official recalled, the park could hardly make any profit and had been 
heavily subsidised by the state. After 2005, the city government began to reduce the financial 
support and wanted the park to generate more income itself. Meanwhile, the cost of labour 
and the cost of living were soaring as a result of the fast economic growth in Shanghai. Many 
local farmers chose to stay at home, because of the insufficient wage offered by the park. 
(3) Personal and institutional connections with the key local respondents, especially the local government 
agencies, constitute another important reason for choosing the three cities.
(4) Given concerns as per research ethics, the detailed background information of these respondents 
such as their actual names and job titles are not given here.
Table 1. Basic information about the three study sites, 2008 [sources: The People’s Government 
of Municipality of Shanghai (2010); The People’s Government of Xinxiang (2009); The People’s 
Government of Kaili (2009)].
Characteristic Shanghai Kaili, Guizhou  Xinxiang, Henan
Level of jurisdiction provincial prefectural prefectural
Population (million) 18.88 0.47 5.61
Approximate GDP ($billion) 228 1 16
Farmland (1000 ha) 205.00 13.16 596.90
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Competition was also becoming more fierce in the agricultural market. Cheaper imported 
foods (eg, wheat from Canada and America) undercut the cost of the local produce. To 
survive, between 2005 and 2009, almost all of the farmland in the park was subdivided into 
small parcels and contracted to private parties, mostly Chinese business people from outside 
Shanghai.
Interview records suggest that a typical contractor paid a lump sum to rent an area of 
farmland for three to five years at a cost of RMB 1500–2000 (circa US $250–333) per square 
metre per annum. Any nonagricultural land use was clearly forbidden in the contract.(5) Many 
contractors took good advantage of the park’s location, which was only 45 km away from 
downtown Shanghai, allowing easy access to the city market at an affordable transport cost. 
Others, however, were struggling. For example, a contractor planting organic rice had faced 
fierce price competition in the Shanghai market, so he decided to change his business model. 
He found out from the newspapers that many white collar workers who work in the inner city 
would rather spend their weekend in the countryside, planting for fun. So he quickly had a 
plan to build a small guesthouse to accommodate the weekenders and attract them to Wushe. 
Nevertheless, both the laws and his contract with the park stipulated that farmland could 
not be converted to other uses. When he consulted with the park officials, to his surprise, 
his business plan was actually endorsed and even encouraged. The park officials told him 
to start building the guesthouse, while they would seek a special planning permission in the 
meantime. A new contract was signed, stating that that the guesthouse must be modestly 
sized and profits shared with the local authority. When the author visited the guesthouse in 
summer 2009, it had two storeys and contained about fifteen double rooms. A small team of 
local youngsters were working as porters and maids in it.
Following the building of that small guesthouse, agricultural tourism quickly became 
a major revenue earner within Wushe. In most instances, the park management committee, 
on behalf of the local government, allowed the contractors to conduct small-scale farmland 
conversion, but used contractual terms to restrain the actual extent of property development 
on a case-by-case basis. When asked about the legal implications, a park official answered: 
“We have got most special planning permissions from the superiors, while others are still 
being processed … . This is a tricky matter, but we have to build up something to develop 
agricultural tourism.”
5.2 The case of Xijiang and Langde
Guizhou is a mountainous inland province in southwest China. Although most of its 
population are Han (the dominant ethnic majority in China), the southeast part of Guizhou 
has historically been inhabited by ethnic minorities. The region is thus designated as an 
ethnic autonomous prefecture, with the city of Kaili as its capital. Xijiang and Langde are 
two rural communities located in the south periphery of Kaili. More than 90% of the local 
population is ethnic Miao—an ethnic group that used to live isolated in the high mountains 
nearby. Both Xijiang and Langde are endowed with some unique natural as well as cultural 
landscapes, which are highly attractive to tourists.
Since the 1990s, the Guizhou provincial government has adopted an ethnic tourism 
strategy to promote the local economy and to alleviate poverty in the ethnic minority 
region (Donaldson, 2007). Southeast Guizhou thus witnessed extensive local infrastructure 
development, including a new motorway built through the mountains. Soon after the road 
was finished in 1999, Xijiang and Langde were packed with a large crowd of domestic as 
well as international travellers, demanding hotels, restaurants, and even Karaoke clubs. Some 
farmlands would need to be converted to make space for these facilities.
(5) In accordance with Article 63 of the Land Management Law (National People’s Congress, 1998) 
and Articles 32–43 of Rural Land Contract Law (National People’s Congress, 2002).
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Among the two ethnic Miao communities, Xijiang is the larger one, with 1288 local 
households and nearly 6000 residents. The extent of farmland conversion in Xijiang has been 
notable in recent years. Between 2007 and 2010, the stock of agricultural land in Xijiang 
decreased from 17 800 to 17 550 ha. The local respondents confirm that almost all of the 
farmland at the skirts of the surrounding mountains was converted to tourism facilities, 
mostly through compulsory land acquisitions organised by the local government. A state-
owned tourism development company was also set up in 2009 to manage these properties. 
About half of the local households in Xijiang were affected directly by the land expropriation. 
Many of them received compensation for their farmland and later used the money to rent the 
guesthouses built by the tourism management company. Several former farmers, in this way, 
turned into quite successful businessmen. As one of the local contractors admitted during an 
interview, “making a million [RMB] per year is even possible here!” This understandably has 
made the other half of the local population a bit jealous, because their farmland parcels are 
up on the mountains and were not taken by the state: “We can only make the ends meet here 
up the hill”, said one respondent.
On the other hand, not all expropriated farmers were content with their circumstances. 
One farmer in his sixties indicated that he would rather have his small land parcel back, 
because he could not do anything other than farming. He said he was illiterate and, as an 
elderly Miao, could only speak limited Mandarin. It was thus beyond his capability to cater 
to tourists. Although this farmer did receive some land compensation from the state, he soon 
realised that the money would not stretch very far: “Everything becomes more expensive 
after the tourists swarm in”, he grumbled.
Compared with Xijiang village, Langde has seen a much lower degree of polarisation 
among the farmers. This is perhaps because tourism development in Langde has been quite 
spontaneous and self-organised; no farmland was ever expropriated. While the amount of local 
agricultural land did decrease by about 50 ha from 2007 to 2010, most farmland conversions 
seemed to be conducted on a very small scale. Typically, rather than build a modern hotel, 
a local family would share its traditional log house with the tourists and provide them with 
customary ethnic meals.
As a village of only 530 residents, Langde is a small but close-knit ethnic Miao 
community. Almost all of the local farmers live off farming; tourism is their supplementary 
economic activity. The local villagers generally hold a strong priority in maintaining their 
original lifestyle and have collectively bargained with the government to refrain from large-
scale development, by emphasising that the authentic local ethnic cultural heritage is what 
actually appeals to the tourists. However, as a result, people in Langde earn much less tourism 
income than their neighbours in Xijiang, primarily as the result of underinvestment by the 
local government. Unlike Xijiang, Langde does not have a state-backed tourism management 
company that can bring in capital to finance the development of local infrastructures such as 
lodges and restaurants. Per capita tourism income in Langde was estimated to be merely 206 
RMB (circa US $33) in 2010, compared with 5437 RMB (circa US $863) in Xijiang.
5.3 The case of Xiaodian
Xiaodian is an industrial development zone to the east of Xinxiang, a medium-size city in 
central China’s Henan Province. Xiaodian was formally approved to operate in 2003. By 
that time, all of the farmland within Xiaodian had been expropriated by the city government 
and was pending conversion. The plan was to attract businesses to the locality to set up 
factories that could absorb the surplus rural labour. But by summer 2009 there were only a 
handful of small cotton processing plants in the area. Most of the workers were young local 
women whose husbands and brothers either worked elsewhere or stayed at home, living off 
the compensation they had received a few years ago for the expropriated farmland.
Negotiating the farmland dilemmas 11
Despite its designation as an industrial zone, it was striking to see sporadic grain fields 
inside this area, where some elderly farmers were busy working. According to the farmers, 
these land parcels used to belong to their village and were later taken by the government, but 
since then remained unused for years. They thought it was such a waste and started planting 
on the land again. The local officials had allowed them to keep the crops. Several old farmers 
also stressed that they were not planting for money. Rather, they had been so used to farming 
that they felt uncomfortable not doing so.
A city land official working in the industrial zone confirmed this situation later. She 
admitted that, in the official land-use plan, these parcels were designated as state owned 
and for industrial use only, but “planting it is better than leaving it vacant”. She recalled 
that, when the Xinxiang government first heard of this incident, her colleagues in the city 
did debate about how to respond. But finally they decided to simply acquiesce, because the 
city government was also under pressure to meet the food production quota (6) assigned by the 
provincial authority. “Our province is a major food supplier in the country and every year we need 
to meet certain quotas”, explained the official, “but doing so doesn’t make us richer and farmland 
conversion tends to be discouraged by the central government.” The city authority was afraid of 
repercussions from Beijing, if this ‘waste’ of farmland was publicised.
So the deal was that the farmers could freely work the unused farmlands and sell the 
products to the state, but the farmers’ access to land would never be officially registered or 
protected. This arrangement had to be made ‘under the table’, because the land parcels had 
already been expropriated and assigned to industrial use in the official plan. More importantly, 
had the city followed any formal procedures, officials in Beijing would have found out.
How was this deal actually negotiated between the local authorities and the farmers? 
Members of the local village committee told a story. After hearing the city government’s 
decision, the village committee first persuaded local residents to let poor elderly villagers 
have these parcels, because, in Chinese culture, it was considered shameful to compete with 
elders and the vulnerable. Moreover, most of the young people in the area wanted to leave 
the farms and even the villages. “The kids wouldn’t plant the land even if they had it”, said 
one village committee member in his forties. Second, among the poor elderly, the committee 
prioritised those who had planted in the vacant parcels before. “They used to plant there for 
decades; everyone agrees it is their land”, said another cadre member. Third, in return, the 
village committee asked the cultivators to share a portion of their profits within the village, 
though the actual percentage varied case by case. When asked whether there was anything 
written, even just as an informal covenant, the female head of the village committee indicated 
that many seniors were illiterate: “we just rely on trust”.
6 Learning from ‘barefoot planners’
6.1 Informal planning solution
As summarised in table 2, informal planning solutions seem a common element across the 
three cases reported above. In the case of Wushe, a state-led agroindustrial park chose to 
negotiate, under financial pressure, with private farm contractors. While the former did intend 
to preserve farmland and produce food, reduced government subsidies and fierce market 
competition had forced it to seek an alternative source of revenue. The private contractors 
(6) The central government in China tends to monopolise the food market by purchasing grains from 
farmer households across the country at a price level set by the state (Oi, 1991). Although some 
market-based mechanisms have been adopted in the recent years (eg, Xinhua, 2012), this is still a 
semicompulsory food production system administered by the different levels of government. For 
example, in this case Henan is a major agricultural province that has always been assigned a large 
food production quota by Beijing. The provincial government thus further allocates its quota to the 
lower levels of authorities within its jurisdiction.
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took this opportunity to change the use of their farmland subdivisions, not by directly 
applying for a planning permission but by amending the terms of their contracts with the 
Wushe Park. In return, the park officials managed to control the scale of farmland conversion 
on a case-by-case basis, using arm’s-length bilateral agreements.(7) What characterised both 
parties was a strong spirit of entrepreneurism, as reflected in their mutual interest to try out a 
new business model notwithstanding the rigid land-use regulations. The outcome was a kind 
of localised reconciliation of the dilemma between food security and public finance, in the 
sense that most of the farmland ended up retained, while a small portion was converted to 
generate revenues from agricultural tourism.
In the case of Xijiang, the primary issue appeared to be the local peoples’ polarised 
situations after the state-led farmland conversion. Those who could adapt to the change of 
livelihoods saw a substantial rise in their income, thanks to the booming local economy. For 
more vulnerable farmers, however, the transition challenged their basic living conditions. A 
dilemma in terms of farmer livelihoods thus clearly arose in Xijiang. However, the experience 
of the nearby Langde Village provided a potential solution. Also by developing ethnic tourism, 
Langde featured an informal and voluntary model involving very little state intervention. 
Local farmers in Langde used their own houses to accommodate the visitors and refrained 
from converting farmland for large-scale constructions. As a result, Langde saw a much less 
drastic transformation in terms of the local farmers’ livelihoods. Most people in Langde 
continued to major in plantation, while ethnic tourism became their ancillary livelihood.
In the case of Xiaodian, the local government took away a large division of farmland to 
establish an industrial development zone that failed to draw business. The local authority 
dared not publicly return the farmland to the local village, for fear of repercussions by Beijing. 
Instead, the local officials acquiesced the informal, spontaneous farmland reclamation by 
the elderly villagers. Although no contract was written, verbal deals were made between the 
bureaucrats and the local farmers, coordinated by the village committee members. In this case, 
(7) This is analogous to the use of a set of private covenants to substitute for formal zoning regulations 
in some US localities (Fischel, 2001; 2004).
Table 2. Informal solutions to the farmland dilemmas
Case Wushe Xijiang/Langde Xiaodian
Dilemma conserving farmland for 
national food security 
versus converting 
farmland to raise local 
government income
facilitating farmland 
conversion to encourage 
farmers’ transition toward 
urban livelihoods versus 
protecting farmland to 
ensure the most vulnerable 
farmers’ basic living 
conditions
preserving farmland 
through strict nationwide 








local officials allowing 
farmland conversion but 
using specific contractual 
terms to control the extent 
of conversion
ethnic minority farmers 
managing to develop local 
tourism while retaining 
the traditional livelihoods 
and resisting state-led land 
expropriation in order 
to protect their cultural 
heritage
members of village 
committee facilitating the 
negotiations between the 
city government and the 
local farmers, enabling 
the latter to plant on 
the farmlands already 




officials and small 
farmland contractors
ethnic minority farmers village committee 
members
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what saved the farmland was not the central government’s strict regulation, but rather the 
local parties’ willingness to negotiate.
In summary, each of the three cases involves some informal actions, which resulted 
in a locally sound resolution of the seemingly intractable dilemmas related to farmland 
conversion. While findings from these cases should in no way be generalised beyond their 
contexts, they do suggest that good solutions to ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) planning 
problems can often be learnt from the practice.
6.2 Who are the ‘barefoot planners’?
A closer look into the three cases also reveals some key actors who play the pivotal role of 
barefoot planners in addressing the farmland dilemmas within their own specific context 
(see table 2). In the Wushe case the barefoot planners were the entrepreneurially minded 
local officials and small contractors who planned the farmland conversion by revising their 
business agreements. In the Langde case the barefoot planners were the ethnic minority 
villagers who planned the local tourism development by refraining from extensive state-
led farmland conversion. In the Xiaodian case the barefoot planners were the local village 
committee members who planned the farmland retention by coordinating the socioeconomic 
relations within the village. While none of these actors is a formal professional planner, he or 
she is indeed a barefoot planner, in the same sense that unaccredited doctors who see patients 
in the Chinese countryside are called ‘barefoot doctors’(see, eg, Sidel, 1972).
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, ‘barefoot planner’ is not an entirely new 
construct in the planning literature. The idea is deeply rooted in a classic canon of planning 
scholarship—that is, social learning (Friedmann, 1987). The term ‘barefoot planner’ is 
even specifically used and elaborated in a couple of important papers about international 
development planning (Oberlander, 1987; Zinn et al, 1993). In this sense, while the barefoot 
planners in the above three cases probably do not even know they were planning farmland 
use, their stories are indeed worth studying to better inform planning education and research.
6.3 Toward a social learning turn in China planning
An even broader implication of this study is that it demonstrates social learning as an 
alternative approach to understanding and reconstructing the discourses about urban 
planning in China. Bottom-up informal planning practice has been largely underplayed or 
even neglected in the existing state-centric technorationalist discourse, partly because of the 
general mode of planning research in China, in which planning knowledge is very much 
transferred as a commodity only between the elite bureaucrats and technical experts, leading 
to its disconnection from the often locally contextualised ‘social values’, ‘political strategy’, 
and ‘social action’ (Friedmann and Abonyi, 1976, pages 930–933). In this vein, the failure 
of official farmland planning regime mentioned in this study can indeed be attributed to a 
lack of social learning in the contemporary China planning scholarship. Yet, as shown in this 
study, once we manage to escape from a ‘Euclidean’ (Friedmann, 1987) obsession which 
sees planning merely as preparing technical documents, and try instead to proactively learn 
from actual planning practice by barefoot planners, we see a host of sound localised planning 
resolutions to those seemingly intractable farmland use policy dilemmas.
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Drawing on three cases of informal farmland use planning, we identify some local solutions 
to a series of fundamental dilemmas related to farmland conversion in China’s urban 
periphery. The first case shows that private land-use contracts can be more effective than 
state regulations in flexibly controlling the extent of local farmland conversion, while still 
contributing revenues to the local public finance. The second case suggests that, compared 
with compulsory land acquisition, voluntary spontaneous land-use decision making may lead 
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to a more equitable outcome in terms of local farmers’ livelihoods. The third case indicates 
that farmland can be preserved on the basis of local consensus rather than by enforcing strict 
land-use laws from top down.
While findings from these cases are admittedly anecdotal, they have a couple of important 
implications, however. First, under many practical circumstances, informal planning by 
barefoot planners—such as local officials, ethnic minority farmers, and village cadre 
members—seem to better resolve those practical challenges faced by professional planners. 
Second, learning from the barefoot planners not only allows us to identify practical solutions 
to some seemingly intractable farmland dilemmas, but also gives us the confidence to call 
for a more general transition toward social learning as a new mode of planning scholarship 
in contemporary China to counteract the dominance of state-centric technorationalism. 
A social learning turn in China planning, so to speak, is hoped to trigger more reflexive 
intellectual engagements with the various planning informalities which have been taking 
place at the grassroots and local level and have been shaping the Chinese urban landscape 
from the bottom up vis-à-vis the state-led planning formalities.
In a more pragmatic sense, planning research is ultimately about what action can be taken 
to make a substantive difference. For this purpose, a series of policy recommendations are 
recommended as follows:
(a) The public administration of farmland use in China needs to be more flexible. More 
contract-based land-use management (as in the case of Wushe) and market-based intervention 
can be introduced into the system instead of entirely relying on command and control. One 
way to do so is to allow transactions of farmland conversion rights, as already experimented, 
for example, in east China’s Zhejiang province (Wang et al, 2010).
(b) The state monopoly of farmland conversion needs to be critically reviewed in reference 
to Article 43 of the Land Use Management Law (National People’s Congress, 1998), which 
limits almost all types of farmland conversion to the eminent domain. A review of this legal 
term is most important to ensure social harmony and also the efficiency of governance 
(Osborne, 1993). As shown in many incidents, compulsory land acquisitions often coerce 
farmers and result in serious social polarisations as well as contentions. If the rural grassroots 
are given more rights to decide local land use, it is reasonable to expect some more desirable 
social and environmental consequences (as in the case of Langde).
(c) It is also necessary to reassess the rationality of farmland planning in China, which arguably 
features an obsession with nationwide formalised planning strategies and one-size-fits-all 
public policy making. Such one-plan-for-all rationality is indeed a reflection of the state-
centric technorationalism underlying the dominant planning discourse in China. To address 
this issue, professional planners ought to learn from and even try to become barefoot planners, 
who mainly resolve issues through informal local negotiation and consensus building (as in 
the case of Xiaodian). In this sense, some directional changes are quite necessary in China’s 
overall planning education system, which tends to overfocus on formal spatial planning and 
design, but with far less attention paid to social learning from grassroots-based planning 
informalities as everyday planning practice.
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